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A CANCER ON THE INTERNET:  
A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REGULATION OF  
INSURRECTIONIST SPEECH ON THE WEB 
Sean August Camoni∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Skinheads have YouTube channels.  Secessionists maintain Face-
book pages.  The Internet is a vast, largely unregulated universe 
where anyone can say anything at anytime and remain anonymous if 
he or she wishes.  The Internet has expanded educational and com-
munication opportunities in ways and to places never before im-
agined.  It has exploded new economic frontiers, resulting in the faci-
litation of business and advertisement for millions.  But the Internet 
can also be a very dangerous place, rife with hate speech, identity 
theft, fraud, sexual predators, and other illicit activities.  The virtually 
unlimited audience for websites, the low cost of producing and pub-
lishing content, and the ability to remain anonymous as a speaker or 
listener all are factors that make the Internet an ideal place for those 
who hold radical beliefs to recruit others to aid in their causes. 
In the wake of the attempted assassination of Congresswoman 
Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona,
1
 former Alaska Governor Sa-
rah Palin was criticized for a map of the United States, posted online 
during the 2008 elections, with gunsights drawn over contested con-
gressional districts, including Congresswoman Giffords’ district as 
well as her name.
2
  There is no evidence that Palin’s map, or her on-
line exhortation to fellow conservatives not to “retreat,” but to “rel-
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University Law School, May 2011; B.A.H., 1999, Vil-
lanova University. 
 1 Marc Lacey and David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/09/us/politics/09giffords.html. 
 2 Brian Montopoli and Robert Hendin, Sarah Palin Criticized over Gabrielle Giffords 
Presence on “Target List,” POLITICAL HOTSHEET, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2011, 7:16 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20027918-503544.html?tag=content 
Main;contentBody; see also Jillian Rayfield, Palin Uses Crosshairs to Identify Dems Who 
Voted for Health Care Reform, TPM (March 24, 2010), http://tpmlivewire. 
talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/03/palin-uses-crosshairs-to-identify-dems-who-voted-
for-health-care-reform.php. 
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oad,”
3
 at all influenced the Tucson gunman, Jared Lee Loughner.  
But the nationwide discussion of violent public rhetoric that occurred 
in the aftermath of the shooting cast a spotlight on the dangers of in-
citeful speech on the internet. 
In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security released a 
report warning of the rising danger of right-wing extremism in the 
United States.
4
  The report warned that the economic downturn, 
coupled with the election of the first African-American President, was 
creating a “fertile recruiting environment” for white supremacist and 
antigovernment groups.
5
  These groups “gain new recruits by playing 
on their fears.”
6
  The report stated that in the 1990s, similar groups 
and a similar political and economic climate “contributed to the 
growth in the number of domestic right-wing terrorist and extremist 
groups and an increase in violent acts,” including the 1995 bombing 
of the Oklahoma City Federal Building.
7
  The report points out that 
military veterans returning from war, who already “face significant 
challenges in reintegrating into their communities,” have “combat 
skills and experience” that make them attractive recruitment targets.
8
  
The Department of Homeland Security “is concerned that right wing 
extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in 
order to boost their violent capabilities,” which could lead to “the po-
tential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable 
of carrying out violent attacks.”
9
 
The Internet is the most powerful tool available to these groups 
by which they can recruit new members.  The inability of current First 
Amendment jurisprudence to account for the type of communication 
performed on the Internet hampers the regulation of Internet 
speech.  The federal government should be able to regulate speech 
on the Internet when that speech advocates criminal acts.  Congress 
should enact a statutory scheme granting law enforcement greater 
 
 3 Id. 
 4 See U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, 
RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING 
RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at 
www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf [hereinafter RIGHTWING EXTREMISM].   
 5 Id. at 2. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 2–3. 
 9 Id. 
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power to head off violent acts like those anticipated by the DHS re-
port.
10
 
There is no constitutional guarantee of unfettered access to the 
Internet for those who would use that medium to advocate unlawful 
acts or recruit supporters to join them in committing acts of violence.  
Freedom to speak is not the same as the right to a megaphone.  If, 
however, the First Amendment is to have any meaning at all, then we 
must protect even that speech which is most offensive to us.  We must 
preserve “freedom for the thought that we hate.”
11
 
This Comment will argue that Congress should expand 18 
U.S.C. § 1717, which prohibits the dissemination of materials advocat-
ing for or urging insurrection or other violations of U.S. law through 
the mail, to also prohibit such communications via the Internet, and 
that such an expansion would not run afoul of First Amendment pro-
tections of free speech.  Part II presents a case study of examples of 
secessionist speech taken from Texas in the summer and fall of 2009.  
Part III sets forth the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence 
as it pertains to subversive speech, particularly the Brandenburg Doc-
trine and the difficulties in applying Brandenburg in an Internet con-
text.  Part IV examines § 1717, which renders insurrectionist mate-
rials non-mailable and makes the case for a similar provision to 
regulate the Internet.  Part IV also proposes new statutory language 
and analyzes the case examples from Part II under the proposed reg-
ulation.  In implementing this type of regulation, Congress should, as 
always when regulating speech, draw the statute narrowly so as not to 
chill legitimate speech on the Internet.  The balance that must be 
struck is delicate indeed. 
II. CASE STUDY IN INSURRECTIONIST SPEECH ON THE INTERNET: 
TEXAS SECESSIONISTS 
“I may run for president of Texas.”
12
  Chuck Norris is toying with 
a run at the highest office in the land, and is not deterred in the least 
by the fact that the land, an independent Republic of Texas, does not 
 
 10 The DHS report cites possible “violent acts targeting government facilities, law 
enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors,” made more dangerous by 
“high volume purchasing and stockpiling of weapons,” as the types of acts antic-
ipated.  RIGHTWING EXTREMISM, supra note 4, at 2, 3. 
 11 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 655 (1929).  
 12 Chuck Norris, I May Run for President of Texas, WORLDNETDAILY.COM (March 9, 
2009), http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=91103. 
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currently exist.  The Delta Force
13
 star and “Total Gym”
14
 pitchman 
thinks an independent Texas may be a reality soon, born of necessity, 
he argues, “if the state of the union continues to turn into the enemy 
of the state.”
15
  Citing the then two-month-old Obama Administra-
tion’s deficit spending policies, Norris suggested that secession may 
be the only solution for downtrodden states and that Texas was the 
most likely candidate to begin the exit parade.
16
  “Anyone who has 
been around Texas for any length of time knows exactly what we’d do 
if the going got rough in America.”
17
  According to Chuck Norris, 
when the going gets rough in America, Texas leaves.
18
  Norris is no 
“Lone Wolf McQuaid”
19
 on secession, however, as the Governor of 
Texas echoed Norris’s sentiments soon after. 
The month after Norris threw his hat into the non-existent ring 
on Fox News’s Glenn Beck Show, Texas Governor Rick Perry told 
several thousand protestors that he too sees secession as a not-too-
distant possibility.
20
  On Tax Day, April 15, 2009, Governor Perry ad-
dressed several so-called “Tea Party” protests, comprised of crowds of 
Republicans, conservatives, and libertarians bearing “Don’t Tread on 
Me” flags and signs with anti-Socialism, anti-Communism, and anti-
Obama slogans.
21
  Perry faced the crowds, who held signs that read, 
“Liar in Chief” and “I’ll Keep My Guns and Money, You Keep the 
Change,” and told them that he did not consider them to be “right-
wing extremists.”
22
  But he confided, “if you are, I’m with you.”
23
  
Some among the throng shouted, “Secede!”
24
  In Austin, Perry told 
the tea partiers that the federal government is “rampaging through 
the halls of Congress” and that Washington needs to “re-read the 
 
 13 See The Delta Force, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/ 
title/tt0090927/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2009). 
 14 See TOTAL GYM, http://www.totalgymdirect.com/?key=EFI (last visited Dec. 24, 
2009).  
 15 Norris, supra note 12. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Lone Wolf McQuaid, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/ 
title/tt0085862/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).  
 20 See Dave Levinthal and Gromer Jeffers Jr., Thousands Show up for Dallas ‘Tea Par-
ty’; Rick Perry Fires Up Rallies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (April 16, 2009), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/041509dnm
etteaparties.d8880855.html. 
 21 See id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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Constitution.”
25
  The alternative for Texas, he said, might just be to 
leave.
26
 
After the speech in Austin, Perry was asked if he agreed with 
those in the crowd who advocated secession from the Union.
27
  He 
answered, “There’s absolutely no reason to dissolve it.  But if Wash-
ington continues to thumb their nose at the American people, you 
know, who knows what might come out of that.”
28
 
Perry’s stance on secession is problematic for two reasons.  First, 
Texas secession under current circumstances is entirely impracticable 
for financial reasons.
29
  That fact robs the Governor’s rhetoric of any 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Levinthal, supra note 20. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Id.  Perry waffled on this point in a Fox News interview on May 14, telling Neil 
Cavuto that he never said that Texas should secede.  Ryan Powers, Perry Again Refuses 
to Reject Secession, THINK PROGRESS (May 14, 2009, 8:37 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/2009/05/14/perry-secession/.  According to Perry, what 
he really meant was, “We live in a great country . . . and I saw no reason at all for us 
to be even talking about seceding, but if Washington continues to force these pro-
grams on the states, if Washington continues to disregard the Tenth Amendment, 
who knows what happens.”  Id.  This equivocation was followed three days later by an 
editorial that backpedalled even harder:   
I can’t say I was surprised that critics worked so hard to recast my de-
fense of federalism and fiscal discipline into advocacy for secession 
from the Union.  Of course, I have never advocated for secession and 
never will.  Like the President, members of Congress and every other 
state governor, I have sworn oaths to our nation and Constitution.  My 
sincere pledge to uphold and defend the Constitution has fueled my 
concern and my statements about the recent unprecedented expansion 
of our federal government.   
Press Release, Gov. Rick Perry, Reflections on a Raging Debate (May 17, 2009), avail-
able at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/editorial/12389/.   
 29 Texans paid $86,612,253,000 in individual federal income tax in 2007, the 
most recent year available.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2007: HISTORICAL 
TABLE 2, SOI BULLETIN (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/ 
article/0,,id=171535,00.html (click on TX in map).  Overall federal expenditures in 
Texas in 2008 totaled $392,100,177,745.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONSOLIDATED 
FEDERAL FUNDS REPORT 2008, available at http://www.census.gov/govs/cffr/ (choose 
“Texas” in dropdown menu, then click “Go”).  That means Texas took 3.5 times as 
much money out of the pot as it put in.  State and local sales taxes in Texas were pro-
jected to generate only $77.5 billion for 2008–09.  Susan Combs, TX Comptroller, 
Texas Taxes, WINDOW ON STATE GOV’T, http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxes/ (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2011).  Texas has no state income tax with which to regain any por-
tion of the remaining shortfall if they did secede.  Id.  Even if the state implemented 
an income tax, it would need to collect $10,374.17 from every man, woman, and 
child, assuming that the entire population remains in an independent Texas.  
POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
POPULATION FOR COUNTIES OF TEXAS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2007 (CO-EST2007-01-
48) (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/tables/CO-
EST2007-01-48.xls (projected 2007 population of Texas was 23,904,380).  That is 
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real threat.  The second problem for Perry’s position is that secession 
is unconstitutional and therefore a violation of U.S. law.
30
  In the 
landmark case of Texas v. White, the Supreme Court ruled that when 
Texas and other southern states seceded to form the confederacy, 
their actions had absolutely no legal effect on the union under the 
Constitution.
31
  The Court held that by the Articles of Confederation, 
“the Union was solemnly declared to ‘be perpetual.’ . . . [T]he Con-
stitution was ordained ‘to form a more perfect Union.’  It is difficult 
to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these 
words.  What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more 
perfect, is not?”
32
  The union between Texas and the other states was 
no less indissoluble than that of the original thirteen states that rati-
fied the Constitution.
33
  It was an interpretation of the Union shared 
by President Abraham Lincoln, who said of the secessionists, “In their 
view, the Union, as a family relation, would not be anything like a 
regular marriage at all, but only as a sort of free love arrangement to 
be maintained on what that sect calls passionate attraction.”
34
  Mod-
ern scholars concur, and the consensus is that no constitutional basis 
for a legal secession exists.
35
 
In viewing Governor Perry’s statements in this light, one can rea-
sonably describe his actions as advocating for an act against the laws 
of the United States.  But Governor Perry’s words were mild and weak 
 
nearly triple the per capita federal tax burden in effect in 2007.  This fiscal reality 
makes it impracticable to secede and still maintain anywhere near the current level 
of government services and programming and moreover defeats the purpose of se-
ceding to avoid what are perceived to be onerous federal income taxes. 
 30 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), overruled in part by Morgan v. United 
States, 113 U.S. 476, 496 (1885). 
 31 Id. at 724–26 (“The position . . . that the legislature of Texas, while the State 
was owner of the bonds, could limit their negotiability by an act of legislation, of 
which all subsequent purchasers were charged with notice although the bonds on 
their face were payable to bearer, must be regarded as overruled.”). 
 32 Id. at 724–25. 
 33 Id. at 726. 
 34 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, LINCOLN’S VIRTUES: AN ETHICAL BIOGRAPHY 451 (2002). 
 35 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 242 (2006).  
Citing Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Amar asserts, “In the event a state made 
war on the United States, those who fought for the state would be, in a scarlet word, 
traitors: ‘Treason against the United States, shall consist . . . in levying War against 
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort.’”  Id.  Amar also 
points to a rejected provision proposed by Anti-Federalist Martin Luther at the Con-
stitutional Convention which would have excluded from the Article III definition of 
“Treason” any citizen who acted against the United States in a “Civil War” between a 
state and the “General” government.  Id.  Despite Luther’s warnings that “the treason 
clause as finally worded made no exception for unilateral state secession or civil war,” 
the American people ratified the Constitution with the treason clause intact.  Id. 
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when compared to some other secessionists in Texas.  In August 
2009, a group calling itself the “Texas Nationalist Movement” held a 
rally in Austin to deliver a petition demanding “Sovereignty or Seces-
sion.”
36
 Asserting that the Declaration of Independence gives them 
the right to “alter or abolish” the government if, “after a long train of 
abuses” it has failed to protect the people’s rights, the “Movement” 
invited Governor Perry to join them in Austin, but he declined.
37
  The 
event’s organizers claim to have gathered over one million signatures 
on the petition, a number called into question by the group’s reti-
cence in actually making the petition public as well as the meager 
turnout of less than 200 for the August 2009 gathering.
38
  The speak-
ers were not deterred by the lack of public interest, however, railing 
to the secessionist faithful with fervor. 
A. Daniel Miller 
The leader of the Texas Nationalist Movement (“TNM”) is Da-
niel Miller, the former president of the Republic of Texas (“RoT”), 
which is a group that believes Texas was never legally annexed and, 
therefore, has always been an independent nation.  According to the 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, RoT teaches its 
members a complex set of bank fraud, document fraud, and “paper 
terrorism” techniques, which RoT justifies through “elaborate con-
spiracy theories” and the belief that the United States has no legal au-
 
 36 See Ian Millhiser, Texas ‘Tenthers’ Plan Pro-Secession Rally Tomorrow, THINK 
PROGRESS (Aug. 28, 2009, 8:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2009/08/28/texas-
tenthers-rally/.  The petition demands “the abolishment of all legislation which in-
fringes in the least upon the rights of the people.”  Sovereignty or Secession Declaration 
and Petition, WE THE PEOPLE, http://www.drawaline.org/Sovereignty_or_ 
Secession_Petition.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).  It is difficult to conceive of any 
law that does not in some way limit the absolute liberty of someone.  The petition al-
so demands “that the United States of America should restore the Republic of Texas 
to its original boundaries of 1844.”  Id.  For that demand to be met, the new Republic 
of Texas would have to annex parts of present-day Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Wyoming.  See Map of Texas and Countries Adjacent, 1844, DAVID 
RUMSEY MAP COLLECTION http://www.davidrumsey.com/maps2548.html (last visited 
April 18, 2011).  
 37 Forrest Wilder, “We Hate the United States”: Secessionists Rally at Capitol While Perry 
Stays Home, TEXAS OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2009), available at http://www.alternet.org/ 
news/142340/%22we_hate_the_united_states%22:_secessionists_rally_at_tx_capitol_
/?page=1.  The Declaration of Independence, of course, has no legal authority.  See, 
e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Declara-
tion of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon 
the courts.”). 
 38 See Wilder, supra note 37. 
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thority over an independent Texas.
39
  In 1997, an RoT leader kid-
napped two people, declared them “prisoners of war” for twelve 
hours, sought a prisoner exchange for the release of two RoT mem-
bers, and conducted a weeklong armed standoff with police.
40
  In 
1998, two RoT members were convicted of plotting to assassinate var-
ious government officials, including President Bill Clinton, intending 
to build “a cigarette lighter that would shoot cactus thorns dipped in 
biological agents such as anthrax, rabies, botulism, and AIDS.”
41
  As 
president of RoT, Miller advocated some cooperation with the U.S. 
government, saying that “[t]he American people are our broth-
ers. . . . We extend a helping hand.”
42
  The cooperation Miller offered 
was to organize border patrols to “collect and forcibly deport Mex-
ican immigrants illegally crossing the border,” in direct contravention 
of INS instructions.
43
 
Now president of TNM, Miller addressed the small crowd at the 
Austin rally, calling on the state legislature to choose either “sove-
reignty or secession,” and stating that, “if [the state legislators] do not 
pick up that banner and carry it high, then we will.”
44
  To illustrate his 
point, Miller leapt into the crowd to hoist a flag with the image of an 
M-16 assault rifle under the slogan “Come and Take It,” one of the 
“Tea Party” fringe’s favorite symbols.
45
  The blazon of “Come and 
Take It” over an image of a cannon adorned the battle flag that the 
actual Republic of Texas flew in the war against Santa Anna’s army.
46
  
The modern update is one of many items sold online as part of the 
secessionist movement.
47
 
 
 39 Terrorism Knowledge Base, MEMORIAL INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070930033315/http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?grou
pID=95 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  MIPT is a non-profit organization dedicated to 
preventing terrorism on U.S. soil or mitigating its effects.  MIPT is funded by the 
Dept. of Homeland Security. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.  It should be noted that, among other flaws in this plot, AIDS is a syndrome, 
and not a tangible substance into which cactus needles could be dipped. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Wilder, supra note 37. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Texas Gonzales Flag, TEXAS FLAG MAN, http://www.texasflagman.com/ 
catalog/product_info.php?cPath=2&products_id=65 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 47 See, e.g., TEXAS FLAG MAN, http://www.texasflagman.com/catalog/.  The prod-
ucts at this site are sold by the group “TexasSecede.org,” whose website links through 
to Miller’s TNM website.  Among the offerings of the “Flag Man” are the Texas State 
Flag, the Alamo Flag from 1824, the Gadsen “Don’t Tread on Me!” Flag, and the 
Confederate Battle Flag.  The “Flag Man” does not carry the American Flag. 
CAMONI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:51 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1013 
Another point of historical affection for Miller and many seces-
sionists is the Confederacy.  Miller painted a nostalgic image of the 
Civil War at the Austin rally, indicating the statute of Lady Liberty 
atop the Capitol.  “‘When they raised her to the top of this Capitol 
they wanted to face her south so she would forever have her back 
turned to that nation to the north that knew not liberty,’ he told the 
almost entirely white crowd.”
48
  The TNM website refers to the Civil 
War as the legally-unjustified slaughter of 630,000 Americans perpe-
trated by a “mythical humanitarian,” Abraham Lincoln, and is critical 
of the Emancipation Proclamation.
49
  Another telling signal of the se-
cessionists’ racial politics appeared on many of their signs at the pro-
tests in Austin: the image of President Barack Obama with his face 
digitally altered to appear as the Joker from Batman.
50
  This image 
became a favorite of the secessionists, tea-party groups, and other ex-
treme right-wing factions in the summer of 2009.  In looking at the 
image, one is immediately struck by the notion that it took the first 
black President and put him in white face; and in clown makeup to 
boot. 
Miller expands on his views at much greater length on the TNM 
website, where he writes blog entries, recruits members, collects do-
nations, and announces upcoming events.
51
  Miller circulates a peti-
tion demanding a popular referendum on secession.
52
  Several of the 
posts refer to a potential military response to a decision by Texas to 
secede.  One Miller post cites a poll stating that “42% of members of 
the armed forces . . . agree secession is a right,” and states that this 
number “raises some interesting questions about what would happen 
to a U.S. soldier from Texas in the unlikely creation of a Lone Star 
Republic.”
53
  Miller argues that the polling “speaks to the question 
that we often get regarding a military response from the Federal Gov-
 
 48 Wilder, supra note 37. 
 49 Lauren Savage, ‘Yes’ If Texas Could Secede, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (Nov. 
1, 2009), http://www.texasnationalist.com/index.php?option=com_myblog 
&Itemid=105. 
 50 See Wilder, supra note 37. 
 51 See TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, http://www.texasnationalist.com/ (last vi-
sited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 52 See Let Texas Decide Petition, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, 
http://www.texasnationalist.com/forms/let-texas-decide-petition-10.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2011). 
 53 Daniel Miller, Military Support for Independence, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
(Sep. 20, 2009) http://www.texasnationalist.com/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=196:military-support-for-independence&catid=8:newsflash& 
Itemid=104. 
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ernment when Texas secedes.”
54
  Seemingly, Miller is suggesting that 
42% of U.S. troops would likely fight against the U.S. military if a 
forcible response were invoked against Texas secession.
55
 
B. Debra Medina 
The TNM website also endorsed the gubernatorial candidacy of 
another speaker at the August rally, Debra Medina.
56
  Medina is a 
“Ron Paul Republican” and was a candidate to replace Perry as Gov-
ernor in 2010.
57
  The Texas Nationalist Movement supports Medina’s 
candidacy because she is pro-secession and supports the invocation of 
“nullification.”
58
  As TNM sees it, nullification is a simple enforcement 
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, thereby allowing states to res-
cind or ignore any federal law that is not explicitly authorized in the 
Constitution.
59
  At TNM’s rally in Austin, Medina shared her outlook 
on secession with the crowd: “We are aware that stepping off into se-
cession may in fact be a bloody war.  We are aware that the tree of 
freedom is occasionally watered with the blood of tyrants and pa-
triots.”
60
  This last line alludes to a Thomas Jefferson quote with an in-
famous history of being taken out of context and used by the anti-
government right wing.
61
  Probably the most notorious use occurred 
when Timothy McVeigh wore the words on a t-shirt as he bombed the 
Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995.
62
 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Part II.C infra and accompanying text regarding Larry Kilgore and Texas 
appropriation of federal military resources. 
 56 See Darryl Mulloy, Steps to Texas Independence, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, 
http://www.texasnationalist.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
204&catid=10:president-blog (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 57 Wilder, supra note 37. 
 58 Mulloy, supra note 56. 
 59 See id. 
 60 Wilder, supra note 37. 
 61 See, e.g., Sean Hannity, Obama Plucking the Tree of Liberty Bare, FOX NEWS (May 6, 
2009) http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,519158,00.html. 
 62 ‘Turner Diaries’ Introduced in McVeigh Trial, CNN (Apr. 28, 1997), 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9704/28/okc/.  The irony of Medina and other propo-
nents of secession and state sovereignty using this Thomas Jefferson quote, a reaction 
to Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, is readily seen when the quote is presented in 
context: 
The people cannot be all, and always, well informed.  The part which is 
wrong will be discontented, in proportion to the importance of the 
facts they misconceive.  If they remain quiet under such misconcep-
tions, it is lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty. . . . 
And what country can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are not warned 
from time to time, that this people preserve the spirit of resistance?  
CAMONI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:51 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1015 
C. Larry Kilgore 
Larry Kilgore hates the United States.
63
  An oft-rejected, though 
never deterred, candidate for Governor of Texas, Kilgore hates pretty 
much everything about the U.S. government.  “We hate the United 
States!” he shouted when it was his turn to address the small crowd at 
the Texas capitol.
64
  “‘I hate that flag up there,’ Kilgore said pointing 
to the American flag flying over the Capitol. ‘I hate the United States 
government. . . .  They’re an evil, corrupt government.’”
65
  Kilgore 
exhorted the crowd to turn this hatred into action: “They need to go. 
Sovereignty is not good enough.  Secession is what we need!”
66
  Larry 
Kilgore wants Texas to leave the United States, and he wants anyone 
who disagrees with him to leave Texas.  After the rally, “Kilgore was 
seen yelling at some health-care reform advocates to ‘Go back to the 
U.S. where you belong.’”
67
 
Kilgore’s online outlets repeatedly advocate for secession and 
other illegal acts.  His Facebook message for Veteran’s Day 2009 read, 
“Thank you Veterans.  If a military coup becomes necessary to protect 
us from domestic enemies, do your duty.”
68
  He is a proponent of the 
 
Let them take arms.  The remedy is to set them right as to the facts, 
pardon and pacify them.  What signify a few lives lost in a century or 
two?  The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the 
blood of patriots and tyrants.  It is its natural manure.   
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), available at 
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-singleauthor?specfile=/web/data/jefferson 
/texts/jefall.o2w&act=text&offset=5674387&textreg=1&query=tree+of+liberty. 
Jefferson saw the unrest in Massachusetts as a sign of ignorance and misconcep-
tion, and the remedy was for the “rulers” to set the malcontents right as to the facts.  
See id.  “For Jefferson, this was a textbook example of how passions could cloud 
judgment, creating an atmosphere of panic and fear.”  Brad Hart, Jefferson’s “Tree of 
Liberty” Quote in Context, AMERICAN CREATION (Aug. 18, 2009, 6:58 PM), 
http://americancreation.blogspot.com/2009/08/jeffersons-tree-of-liberty-quote-
in.html. 
While it is true that Jefferson was wont to hyperbolize regarding the glorification 
of revolution, in this case he was saying only that the passionate overreactions of the 
masses should serve to remind the federal government that the liberty to dissent 
must be preserved.  See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX 99–103 (1996). 
 63 See generally FAQ’S, http://www.larrykilgore.com/Larry_Kilgore/FAQs.html 
(last visited Sep. 21, 2009). 
 64 Wilder, supra note 37.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Larry Kilgore for Gov—Texas Secession, FACEBOOK PAGES, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Larry-Kilgore-for-Gov-Texas-Secession/ 
44066004175 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
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death penalty for homosexuals.
69
  He has posted links to videos of an 
interview on an Iranian state television network, wherein Daniel Mil-
ler and Thomas Naylor, a Vermont secessionist, describe what “free-
dom from American tyranny will be like.”
70
  It is unknown how many 
readers Kilgore’s websites have attracted, but Kilgore did garner 
226,000 votes for Texas Senator in the 2008 Republican primary.
71
 
D. Clay Laird 
Clay Laird did not speak at the August rally, but he did make an 
appearance in the capitol on April 15, 2009, for a hearing before 
Texas’s Senate Transportation and Homeland Security Committee.
72
  
Laird was escorted from the committee chambers when he threat-
ened to visit the homes of Senators who opposed an anti-”sanctuary 
city” measure.
73
  He told legislators that if they did not support the 
bill, they would “hear from him.”
74
  When asked where they could ex-
pect to hear from Laird, he responded, “At your homes.”
75
  
“[W]herever you live. . . . I mean I’m gonna be knocking on your 
door.”
76
  When Committee Chair John Carona cautioned Laird that 
his comment sounded like a threat, Laird assured Carona, “It’s not a 
threat, sir, it’s a promise written in blood.  It might be yours, it might 
be mine.”
77
 
 
 69 See Matt Lum, Protesters Ultimately Want Death for Homosexuals, TEX. TRIANGLE, 
Mar. 2–8, 2001, available at http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/ 
texas/txnews64.htm (“Well, we know punishing homosexuals by death would be ex-
tremely hard in today’s society. . . .  But we hope that we can help to drive it under-
ground so in about twenty or thirty years, the punishment can fit the crime.”). 
 70 Larry Kilgore, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Larry-Kilgore-for-Gov-Texas-
Secession/44066004175 (Oct. 14, 2009); The videos are available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIu5fk8Bejc and http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=pMa12OU903k. 
 71 See Karl-Thomas Musselman, Larry Kilgore Withdraws from Governor’s Race, En-
dorses Debra Medina, BURNT ORANGE REPORT (Dec. 15, 2009, 3:53 PM), 
http://www.burntorangereport.com/diary/9757/larry-kilgore-withdraws-from-
governors-race-endorses-debra-medina. 
 72 See Richard Whittaker, Menacing Behavior Under the Dome, NEWSDESK, AUSTIN 
CHRONICLE (Apr. 15, 2009, 3:06 PM), available at 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/blogs/news/2009-04-15/767665/.  
 73 See id. 
 74 Ben Wear, Witness Escorted by DPS from Senate Hearing, POSTCARDS, 
STATESMAN.COM (Apr. 15, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.statesman.com/ 
blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/politics/entries/2009/04/15/witness_ 
escorted_by_dps_from_s.html.   
 75 Id.  
 76 Whittaker, supra note 72. 
 77 Id. 
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Laird is a secession advocate in Texas and a frequent reader and 
poster on secession blogs and websites.  On a Facebook page oppos-
ing federal gun control, Laird advocated for teaching children as 
young as six how to shoot, and followed with this appeal: “If you are a 
TRUE conserative [sic], move to Texas. We will need your help in the 
comming [sic] years.”
78
  Why Texas may need armed conservatives 
might have something to do with Laird’s post on the TexasSe-
cede.com blog.  In response to a blog entry about the legality of se-
cession, Laird commented, “One simple question for those that say 
we can’t secede: If some of us are willing to die to get Texas out of the 
USSA [sic], how many in the old 48 (am not including Alaska, my 
second home) are willing to die to keep us?”
79
  Three days after that 
post, Laird expanded on the same comment on another website, say-
ing that 
If you want your children to live in a free Capitalist [country], 
then come/stay and join us.  Those of you that want someone to 
take care of you, please leave before we drive you out.  You only 
have a few years to make a decision.  After that the fence on the 
South, West, North, East will be built to keep all [socialists] out.
80
 
He also stated, “Every real Texan knows they are required to have 
weapons and ammunition.”
81
  Laird further suggested that Texas con-
tains and runs most of the military bases in the U.S.
82
 and that when 
soldiers return from overseas, presumably referring to Iraq and Afg-
hanistan, they would assist in the secession effort.
83
 
Just a few weeks later, Laird threatened the Texas Senate com-
mittee members.  Then a few days after that Laird posted a comment 
on another blog page identifying himself as the man who was es-
 
 78 Clay Laird (Oct. 10, 2009, 11:43 PM), Comment to Wall, Fight to Protect the 2nd 
Amendment from H.R. 45, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group. 
php?gid=56069929010#/group.php?v=wall&gid=56069929010. 
 79 Clay Laird (May 26, 2009, 9:18 AM), Comment to Mindless Obedience, Anyone?, 
TEXAS SECEDE! (May 25, 2009, 7:31 PM), http://texassecede.blogspot.com/ 
2009/03/mindless-obedience-anyone.html. 
 80 Clay Laird (May 29, 2009, 12:17 PM), Comment to Tony Romm, So What if Tex-
as Did Secede from the Union, BRIGHT HALL (Apr. 23, 2009, 7:26 PM), 
http://brighthall.aol.com/2009/04/23/so-what-if-texas-did-secede-from-the-
union/7. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Texas is home to 28 of the 440 U.S. military bases located within the continen-
tal United States.  See Military Bases in the Continental US, NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/ 
BasesMilitaryMAp.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 83 See Laird, supra note 80; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text regarding 
the DHS report’s concerns about recruitment of returning veterans. 
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corted out of the Senate hearing the previous week.
84
  He went on to 
say that he was planning to return to the capitol the following day to 
once again “comment” on a House Resolution, and gave the time, 
building address, and room number.
85
  His conclusion was chilling: 
“If you don’t hear from me after tomorrow, please check the Travis 
county jail.  Clay Laird, CDT (Certified Domestic Terrorist).”
86
 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE REGARDING SUBVERSIVE SPEECH: 
THE BRANDENBURG DOCTRINE 
Many of the extreme examples of inciteful speech in the above 
case study may substantially contribute to the possibilities of violence 
that the DHS report warned of.
87
  Regulating such speech would aid 
in achieving the legitimate state interest of preventing violence, but 
the interaction of the First Amendment and the Internet renders this 
kind of regulation a difficult proposition. 
A. The Current State of the Law 
First Amendment doctrine, and in particular, the famous line of 
Supreme Court decisions addressing the restrictions placed on sub-
versive speech, has been explored and explained thoroughly in legal 
scholarship.
88
  For the purposes of this Comment, two judicial tests 
that formed the foundation for the Brandenburg doctrine are particu-
larly relevant. 
The first is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “clear and present 
danger” test.
89
  In Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes wrote that 
the government could place restraints on speech if the “words are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent.”
90
  “Falsely shouting fire in a 
theater and causing a panic” would not be protected speech accord-
 
 84 See Clay Laird (Apr. 20, 2009, 12:33 PM), Comment to No More Government Bai-
louts!, TEXASFRED BLOG (Apr. 17, 2009), http://texasfred.net/archives/4026. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See supra note 4. 
 88 See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE (2007); Thomas 
Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009); Chris 
Montgomery, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of Terrorism?, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 (2009); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207 (1983). 
 89 See Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 90 Id. at 52. 
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ing to Justice Holmes.
91
  Justice Holmes refined the test in his dissent 
from Abrams v. United States, emphasizing the requirement that a dan-
ger be imminent to allow restriction of speech.
92
  The United States 
could “punish speech that produces and is intended to produce a 
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain 
substantive evils.”
93
  Justice Holmes crafted this statement of the test 
in a dissent in which he would have overturned the conviction of the 
defendant for an act Holmes described as “the surreptitious publish-
ing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man” because it presented no 
immediate danger.
94
 
In his powerful dissent, Justice Holmes called for greater protec-
tions for speech than he had in the past.
95
  He said the “ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,” and “that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”
96
  Of our Constitution, he said, “It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment,” so we should “be eternally 
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death.”
97
  Such checks should 
only be imposed where an imminent danger poses a threat to the law, 
and therefore the nation, itself.
98
  As one author aptly put it, “Holmes 
was the closest we have had to a poet judge.”
99
 
Eight years later in Whitney v. California, Justice Holmes joined 
another eloquent opinion urging strong protection of the freedom of 
speech.
100
  Justice Louis Brandeis penned a concurrence “that many 
regard as the greatest judicial statement of the case for freedom of 
speech.”
101
  Brandeis argued that 
those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to 
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensa-
ble to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dis-
 
 91 Id. 
 92 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 93 Id. at 627. 
 94 Id. at 628. 
 95 See LEWIS, supra note 88, at 23–38 . 
 96 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id. 
 98 See id. at 630–31. 
 99 LEWIS, supra note 88, at 33. 
 100 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 101 LEWIS, supra note 88, at 35. 
CAMONI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:51 PM 
1020 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1005 
semination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to free-
dom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government. . . .  Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify sup-
pression of free speech and assembly.  Men feared witches and 
burnt women. . . .  To justify suppression of free speech there 
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if 
free speech is practiced.  There must be reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be 
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a se-
rious one.
102
 
Two years later, evoking his own notion of protecting “expres-
sions of opinions we loathe” expressed in Abrams, Justice Holmes dis-
sented in United States v. Schwimmer.
103
  Justice Holmes disagreed with 
the defendant’s pacifist views, he wrote, but he defended her right to 
express those views.
104
  “[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution 
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the 
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with 
us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”
105
 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis both advocated for strict protec-
tions of speech that should be overcome only where the speech 
creates a clear and imminent danger of some grave harm to our law 
and nation.  That it might have been important to Holmes’s position 
in Abrams that the leaflet was published by an “unknown man” fore-
shadowed the contribution of Judge Learned Hand to this area of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  In Dennis v. United States, Judge 
Hand endorsed “clear and present danger” as a valid “shorthand 
statement” of the general type of speech that the First Amendment 
does not protect, but found that the term did not in itself fully define 
the analysis.
106
  In a variation on the famous Hand Calculus,
107
 Judge 
Hand devised a formula for judges to use in determining whether the 
repression of a particular utterance would be justified.  “In each case 
they must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to 
 
 102 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–78 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 103 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 104 See id. at 654. 
 105 Id. at 654–55. 
 106 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 107 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (In the 
context of tort liability, “if the probability [of injury] be called P; the [gravity of the] 
injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends upon 
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.”) 
CAMONI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:51 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1021 
avoid the danger.”
108
  Chief Justice Fred Vinson adopted this sliding 
scale approach to “clear and present danger” when the Supreme 
Court affirmed Judge Hand’s decision.
109
  The Chief Justice asserted 
that “[o]bviously, the words cannot mean that before the Govern-
ment may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the 
plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.”
110
  The result of Judge 
Hand’s new approach was “a significant watering down of the doc-
trine as interpreted by Justices Holmes and Brandeis—gone were the 
requirements of imminence and intent—and it placed near-absolute 
importance on the perceived threat . . . by the judge and jury.”
111
  
Under Judge Hand’s formula, even the minutest likelihood of the in-
tended evil ever actually coming about could be enough to justify re-
straint on speech if the gravity of the harm was weighty enough.
112
 
The Supreme Court articulated the current constitutional stan-
dard applicable to speech advocating for the commission of unlawful 
acts in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969.
113
  In implementing a very protec-
tive reading of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court held that 
the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”
114
  Under Brandenburg, subversive speech is protected 
from governmental restraint unless it is both (1) intentionally di-
rected at inciting immediate and unlawful action, and (2) likely to ac-
tually produce such action.
115
 
The Brandenburg Doctrine combined the imminence require-
ment from Justices Holmes and Brandeis with the element of likelih-
ood from Judge Hand and Justice Vinson.  In general, it reinforced 
the notion that the “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral pro-
priety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not 
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to 
such action.”
116
  The Court went on to state that a “statute which fails 
to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms 
 
 108 Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212. 
 109 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Montgomery, supra note 88, at 152. 
 112 See id. 
 113 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 114 Id. at 447. 
 115 Id. at 447–48. 
 116 Id. at 448. 
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guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  It sweeps with-
in its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized 
from governmental control.”
117
  Conversely, a statute that does care-
fully draw the distinction between advocating for the use of force or 
violence in the abstract and speech intended to incite some person or 
persons to immediately use force or violence does not intrude upon 
the freedom of speech.
118
 
One further court decision since Brandenburg is worth noting 
here.  In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., the Fourth Circuit examined 
the First Amendment claim of the publisher of a book called Hit 
Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors.
119
  The case 
against the publisher was a wrongful death suit brought by survivors 
of murder victims whose killers applied the very specific and very 
graphic techniques taught in the book.
120
  The publisher stipulated 
that the book was published with the full knowledge and intent that 
the information it contained would be used by readers to commit 
murders-for-hire.
121
  The Court, stating that this type of speech was 
not the “mere advocacy” of an unlawful act, held that the government 
does not need to satisfy the imminency requirement to proscribe 
speech under those circumstances.
122
 
In reaching this holding, the court found that “Brandenburg’s 
imminency requirement . . . did not apply because it is only pertinent 
‘where, as in Brandenburg itself, the government attempts to restrict 
advocacy, as such.’”
123
  The court also found that freedom of speech 
“would not relieve from liability those who would . . . intentionally as-
sist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the 
sanctuary of the First Amendment.”
124
  The court stated that “just be-
cause a message may be disseminated to a wide audience does not au-
tomatically provide First Amendment protection.”
125
  Ultimately, the 
court found that the book constituted speech that was “the antithesis 
of speech protected under Brandenburg.”
126
 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id.  
 119 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 120 See id. at 239. 
 121 See id. at 241. 
 122 Id. at 249. 
 123 Nadine E. McSpadden, Note, Slow and Steady Does Not Always Win the Race, 76 
IND. L.J. 485, 495 (2001) (quoting Rice, 128 F.3d at 246) 
 124 Rice, 128 F.3d at 248. 
 125 McSpadden, supra note 123, at 495. 
 126 Rice, 128 F.3d at 249. 
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If speech urges violence with the intent to provoke the reader to 
act, then under the reasoning of Rice, the imminence requirement 
would not apply because the speech is not “advocacy as such.”
127
  This 
allows for regulation of inciteful speech even without imminence in 
the context of a book, as in Rice, or on the Internet. 
B. The Difficulty of Applying Brandenburg to the Internet 
Commentators have identified the imminency requirement of 
Brandenburg as creating a major impediment to policing truly dan-
gerous speech on the Internet.  “A website will never be able to fulfill 
the imminency requirement.”
128
  The crux of the problem lies in the 
nature of communication on the Internet.  With the exception of 
web tools such as chatting or video conferencing, which are more 
akin to telephonic communication, most communication via the In-
ternet rarely occurs in the contemporaneous manner contemplated 
by the Brandenburg Doctrine.  Most commonly, a poster creates a page 
and publishes it to the web, but because Internet users must log on 
and find content, “it could be a day, a week, or a year before a user 
accesses the Web page.”
129
  Therefore, while any instantaneous com-
munication, such as instant messages or video chats, can satisfy the 
imminence requirement, a traditional webpage is not instantane-
ous—it is speech that is set down to wait for an audience—and as 
such, it presents a circumstance in which a court cannot find immi-
nence. 
Likewise, the imminence requirement recognizes that, if there is 
enough time between the speech and the unlawful act it intends to 
incite, intervening speech from other sources may dissuade the au-
dience from committing that act, and the original speech is therefore 
not dangerous enough to outweigh the protections of the First 
Amendment.
130
  The Internet’s design, however, is perfectly suited to 
allowing users to see, read, and hear only what they seek out, thus 
diminishing the possibility that any other viewpoints will be heard be-
fore a user takes action.
131
  In such circumstances, the lack of immi-
 
 127 Id. at 246. 
 128 McSpadden, supra note 123, at 497; see also Kenneth J. Brown, Assessing The Le-
gitimacy Of Governmental Regulation Of Modern Speech Aimed At Social Reform: The Impor-
tance Of Hindsight And Causation, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 459, 476 (“Analysis 
that courts have traditionally used for other broadcast media simply does not apply 
to the Internet.”). 
 129 McSpadden, supra note 123, at 497. 
 130 See id. at 498. 
 131 Id. 
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nence does not seem to affect the level of danger that a viewer of in-
citeful messages will act upon them. 
Brandenburg simply does not contemplate the Internet context.  
Some recommend “expanding the relatively strict temporal require-
ments of the doctrine’s imminence requirement.”
132
  Regarding web-
sites advocating for terroristic attacks on the United States, one 
commentator argues that in the current climate, indeed in all times 
of threat, there exists a “threshold of imminence” because of the cir-
cumstances, and thus all inciteful speech posted on the Internet 
should be considered to pose an “imminent” danger.
133
  One com-
mentator suggests that courts should consider imminence from the 
point of view of the reader rather than the poster.
134
  Under this read-
ing of the imminence test, “a court would inquire into whether the 
viewer, upon reading the message, is likely to be incited to initiate 
imminent, lawless action.”
135
  All of these scholars stress the impor-
tance of maintaining the protective intent of Brandenburg to avoid a 
chilling effect on legitimate speech while curbing the dangers of in-
citeful speech intended to provoke unlawful action.  Rice differen-
tiated between legitimate speech and speech that did not invoke pro-
tections under Brandenburg, and would leave the imminency 
requirement intact only as a protection of the former. 
If the Rice approach is ignored and Brandenburg is strictly applied 
in all circumstances, dangerous speech on the Internet cannot be re-
gulated without violating the First Amendment.  But a statutory solu-
tion that applies the reasoning from Rice to avoid burdening First 
Amendment rights could remedy this difficulty.  Such regulation is 
not without precedent.  There exists another mode of communica-
tion that is not contemporaneous, but over which Congress has regu-
latory power, and from which insurrectionist speech materials may be 
excluded: the Postal Service. 
 
 132 Montgomery, supra note 88, at 163. 
 133 Thomas E. Crocco, Comment, Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: An Application of 
Brandenburg to Terrorist Websites, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 451, 459 (2004). 
 134 See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for 
an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 425, 456 (2002). 
 135 Id. 
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IV. APPLYING THE NONMAILABILITY PROVISION OF THE  
ESPIONAGE ACT TO THE INTERNET 
A. Section 1717 
In the United States, mailing any material advocating or urging 
treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United 
States is a federal crime.
136
  These kinds of materials were declared 
nonmailable by the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1717, originally passed 
as part of the Espionage Act of 1917.
137
  In the run-up to World War I, 
the Department of Justice was concerned that traditional treason laws 
would not suffice in combating “political agitation . . . of a certain 
character directly affecting the safety of the state.”
138
  The debates sur-
rounding the adoption of the Act reveal much about Congress’s con-
cern with balancing First Amendment freedom of speech against the 
very real danger that some kinds of speech might pose under the cir-
cumstances.
139
 
Regulation of the mail is subject to First Amendment analysis in 
the courts, though this was not always the case.
140
  The Supreme Court 
had originally adopted the “Privilege Doctrine” in dealing with claims 
that a postal regulation unconstitutionally restricted First Amend-
ment rights.  Beginning in Ex Parte Jackson, the Court held that “[t]he 
power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire 
postal system of the country.  The right to designate what shall be 
carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be ex-
cluded.”
141
  The Privilege Doctrine came under a slow-grinding attack, 
and is no longer considered good law.  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, writing in a 1921 dissent, said, “The United States may give 
up the Post office when it sees fit; but while it carries it on the use of 
the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use 
our tongues . . . .”
142
  In 1957, Justice John Marshall Harlan, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part in Roth v. United States, remarked 
that “[t]he hoary dogma of [Jackson], that the use of the mails is a 
 
 136 See 18 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006). 
 137 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 343–346 (1917). 
 138 Rabban, supra note 88, at 1217. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See generally United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1275–76 (D. Md. 
1974) (tracing the history of the Privilege Doctrine and adopting the modern rule 
from Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1976), and Tollett v. United 
States, 485 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
 141 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). 
 142 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 
U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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privilege on which the Government may impose such conditions as it 
chooses, has long since evaporated.”
143
  Then in 1965, Justice William 
O. Douglas quoted Justice Holmes’s dissent in Burleson in the majority 
opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General,
144
 and brought the use of the 
mail to disseminate one’s opinions under the protection of the First 
Amendment.
145
  Therefore, the modern holding is that prohibitions 
contained in postal regulatory statutes “must be construed in the 
light of the First Amendment rather than in the light of any regulato-
ry power granted to the Postal Service.”
146
 
Even before the modern First Amendment analysis of mail regu-
lation, Congress was concerned with restrictions on free speech im-
posed by restrictions on what could be mailed.  The modern § 
1717(a) bars “every letter writing, circular, postal card, picture, print, 
engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, book, or other publi-
cation, matter or thing” that violates several enumerated sections or 
“which contains any matter advocating or urging treason, insurrec-
tion, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States” from the 
mails.
147
  Such material is deemed entirely “nonmailable,” and the sta-
tute prohibits carriers and post offices from conveying it.
148
  Subsec-
tion (b) of § 1717 makes it a crime to use or “attempt to use the mails 
or Postal Service for the transmission of any matter declared by this 
section to be nonmailable,” and prescribes as punishment fines or up 
to ten years imprisonment, or both.
149
 
The Postal Service is given discretion as to the handling of non-
mailable materials under 39 U.S.C. § 3001.  Any materials barred 
from the mail by § 1717, but which nonetheless reach the office of 
delivery, “shall be disposed of as the Postal Service shall direct.”
150
  
This includes the power to destroy illegally mailed items, a power 
which has been upheld despite a First Amendment challenge.
151
 
The nonmailability provision of the Espionage Act was intended 
as a restriction on a particular mode of dissemination of certain types 
of speech, but was not enacted without great consideration of the 
 
 143 354 U.S. 476, 505 n.5 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 144 See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965). 
 145 Id.  
 146 Tollett, 485 F.2d at 1091. 
 147 18 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 39 U.S.C. § 3001(b) (2006). 
 151 See Cherry v. Postmaster General, 272 F. Supp. 982 (D.P.R. 1967). 
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First Amendment.
152
  This provision was approved, while a censorship 
provision in the same bill was struck in conference committee.
153
  The 
censorship portion of the bill would have allowed the President to 
censor the press, which brought much criticism from Congress.
154
  
The major distinction between the two—that which doomed the cen-
sorship provision while the nonmailability provision survived—was 
the issue of prior restraint.
155
  The censorship provision would have 
restricted speech by prohibiting publication (i.e., it would have con-
stituted a “prior restraint”), whereas the nonmailability provision 
placed no restriction on publication, though it “could effectively pre-
vent circulation.”
156
  This distinction is important, because the Su-
preme Court has held that “prior restraints on speech and publica-
tion are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment Rights.”
157
  The Court has also held, however, that en-
joining publication of material that is not “arguably protected 
speech,” is not an impermissible prior restraint where the regulation 
“is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary.”
158
 
Congress also voiced concern about possible abuse in the inter-
pretation of the definition of “treason.”  One representative cau-
tioned, “A whole lot of people here and elsewhere seem to think that 
if a man does not agree with you he is a traitor and guilty of treason-
able utterances.”
159
  As Professor David Rabban points out, however, 
“even vociferous opponents of the nonmailability provision conceded 
throughout the lengthy congressional debates that a variety of publi-
cations should not be circulated.”
160
 
The nonmailability provision was not without precedent at the 
time of its adoption.  The Comstock Act, as amended in 1876, prohi-
bited the transmission of “every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, 
pamphlet, picture, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an 
indecent character” through the mail.
161
  Therefore, the Post Office 
 
 152 See Rabban, supra 88, at 1219–23. 
 153 See id. at 1218. 
 154 Id. at 1218–1219. 
 155 See id. at 1219. 
 156 Id. at 1221. 
 157 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 158 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376, 
390 (1973). 
 159 Rabban, supra note 88, at 1220. 
 160 Id.  
 161 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas 
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 311 (2003); see also 17 Stat. 
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was already empowered to exclude certain matter from the mail, a 
power tested and upheld by the Supreme Court.
162
  Viewed as an ex-
pansion of sorts of the Comstock restrictions, the nonmailability pro-
vision seemed far less onerous than the wholly new restriction on 
speech contained in the censorship provision.
163
 
The constitutionality of the nonmailability provision was upheld 
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten in 1917.
164
  In Masses, a magazine 
called “The Masses,” a self-styled revolutionary publication advocating 
radical, passive resistance to United States’ laws, was deemed unmail-
able by the Postmaster.
165
  The magazine’s publisher argued that the 
statute stifled freedom of the press in violation of the First Amend-
ment.
166
  At the district court level, Judge Learned Hand had con-
strued the Espionage Act as a whole quite narrowly, limiting its re-
strictions on speech to protect “anything less than urging resistance 
to the law.”
167
  The Second Circuit reversed, holding that incitement 
to a crime may be indirect.  Addressing the nonmailability provision, 
the court found that the statute clearly “imposes no restraint prior to 
publication, and no restraint afterwards, except as it restricts circula-
tion through the mails.  Liberty of circulating may be essential to 
freedom of the press, but liberty of circulating through the mails is 
not, so long as its transportation in any other way as merchandise is 
not forbidden.”
168
 
B. The Internet Is Like the Mail 
The history of the Internet’s creation justifies regulating the In-
ternet in a similar manner to the mail.  The Postal Service is a federal 
agency, intended to bring the country together through communica-
tion.
169
  The Internet is essentially a quasi-public entity, having been 
invented and funded solely by the federal government in its early 
 
599 (1873).  The Comstock Act is currently codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006), and 
has not changed substantively in any way relevant to its import for this Comment. 
 162 Rabban, supra note 88, at 1222 (citing In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 133–35 
(1892); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1877)). 
 163 Id.  
 164 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 165 See id. at 34. 
 166 See id. at 27. 
 167 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); see Rabban, supra note 
88, at 1238. 
 168 Masses, 246 F. at 27; see also Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) 
(holding that freedom of the press is not interfered with except by suppression be-
fore publication). 
 169 See infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text. 
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years of existence.
170
  The Internet exists now as an interwoven net-
work of commercial and non-profit websites, which is actually the ful-
fillment of the original designers’ plans.
171
  Thus, the Internet is sub-
stantially similar to the Postal Service, and may be regulated in a 
similar fashion.  Additionally, by its very nature, the Internet is inter-
state commerce and falls fully within the power of Congress to regu-
late under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
172
 
The U.S. Postal Service is a “fundamental service” operated by 
the federal government, “authorized by the Constitution, created by 
Act of Congress, and supported by the people.”
173
  Congress intended 
that the Postal Service would “bind the Nation together through the 
personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the 
people.”
174
  The Postal Service is an agency of the U.S. government 
and, specifically, an “independent establishment of the executive 
branch.”
175
  The Internet is not currently operated by the govern-
ment, but it was, and the motivation behind its creation was—similar 
to that of the Postal Service—to establish a cohesive communication 
system nationwide.
176
 
The Internet began as a system called ARPANET, created by the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA).
177
  During the Cold War, there arose a desire within the mili-
tary for a communication system that the U.S.S.R. could not knock 
out with a single strike.
178
  For example, if a traditional telephone sys-
tem is used, a caller is connected to the receiver through a single 
point, a switchboard.
179
  If the switchboard is disabled, the caller is cut 
off from the receiver.
180
  This is true of any linear communications sys-
tem where information is passed from point to point in a series.
181
  
The idea behind the Internet was to create a web of points, each 
connected to multiple other points instead of a linear series.
182
  That 
 
 170 See infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
 173 39 U.S.C.  § 101(a) (2006). 
 174 Id.  
 175 Id. § 201. 
 176 See infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text. 
 177 See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 2 (1999). 
 178 Id. at 9–11, 13–17. 
 179 Id. at 11.  
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 11–17, 30, 32.  
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way, if any one point is removed from the system, the message can be 
rerouted through other points.
183
 
“The system evolved through an unusual (and sometimes unea-
sy) alliance between military and civilian interests.”
184
  The private 
communications industry would never have originally attempted to 
build the Internet because, for them, the risk outweighed the reward.  
Professionals in the private sector thought the technical approach 
taken by ARPA, a novel “packet switching” approach, was “crazy,” and 
predicted its failure.
185
  So the Department of Defense (“DOD”) took 
the initiative and granted contracts and funding to nonprofits and 
universities to make it work, in addition to the work ARPA did in-
house.
186
  Work done by Rand (formerly RAND), a nonprofit corpora-
tion “dedicated to research on military strategy and technology” and 
funded primarily by contracts from the Air Force and other govern-
mental agencies, was pivotal.
187
  MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory was also in-
volved, with the Lab receiving half of its funding from ARPA.
188
 
For the network to meet its full potential, the military needed it 
to grow exponentially.  By design, ARPANET’s designers and users 
intended that “its techniques would be discussed in professional fo-
rums, taught in computer science departments, and implemented in 
commercial systems.”
189
  The National Science Foundation took con-
trol of the Internet in the 1980s, and subsequently turned the net-
 
 183 ABBATE, supra note 177 at 11 (“A distributed system would have many switching 
nodes, and many links attached to each node.  The redundancy would make it hard-
er to cut off service to users.”). 
 184 Id. at 2. 
 185 Id. at 47. 
 186 See id. at 10, 44. 
 187 Id. at 10. 
 188 See id. at 44. 
During this time, several universities began building their own com-
puter networks to aid research. George Strawn, currently the Chief In-
formation Officer at NSF, was a computer scientist at the University of 
Iowa in the 1970s.  He and colleagues at other universities saw the po-
tential that computer networks had to offer as they began to use email 
and other innovations.  At the same time, the development of micro 
computers meant that universities were moving away from large re-
search computers in favor of many smaller computers dispersed 
around campus.  This posed a problem for researchers who still 
needed access to faster, stronger computers and it opened an oppor-
tunity to expand fledging networks to more and more users. 
NSF and the Birth of the Internet, NAT’L SCIENCE FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/ 
news/special_reports/nsf-net/textonly/70s.jsp (last updated Mar. 23, 2009).  Thus 
universities were ripe for participation in the new Internet once ARPANET went na-
tional.   
 189 ABBATE, supra note 177, at 81. 
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work over to private businesses in the 1990s.
190
  Once the framework 
was in place, the strategy was to allow the profit-driven private sector 
and educational institutions to drive further development.
191
  The 
current form of the Internet, as an almost organic nervous system of 
computer networks, is the fruit of the seeds planted by the federally 
funded Internet development programs.
192
 
In a very real sense, the Internet now functions as a marketplace 
involving the commerce of ideas and goods and services between par-
ties located in different states and in different countries.  The Consti-
tution allows Congress to regulate commerce among the several states 
as well as with foreign nations.
193
  Courts have consistently found that 
transmission of information via the Internet is the equivalent of inter-
state commerce.
194
  Therefore, under the express grant of powers to 
Congress under the constitution, Congress can regulate the Internet. 
The Constitution also grants Congress the power to establish 
post offices and post roads.
195
  Arguably, the power to establish an “In-
ternet” could be implied from that grant of power, though such a 
thing did not exist at the founding.  If the authors of the Constitution 
put enough priority on communication between citizens to make the 
creation of a post office an enumerated power of Congress, logically, 
 
 190 “The National Science Foundation (NSF) is an independent federal agency 
created by Congress in 1950 ‘to promote the progress of science; to advance the na-
tional health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense . . .’  With an 
annual budget of about $6.9 billion (FY 2010), [the NSF is] the funding source for 
approximately 20 percent of all federally supported basic research conducted by 
America’s colleges and universities.  In many fields such as mathematics, computer 
science and the social sciences, NSF is the major source of federal backing.”  See 
About the NSF, NAT’L SCIENCE FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/about (last updated Apr. 7, 
2010). 
 191 ABBATE, supra note 177, at 81. 
 192  Indeed, ARPA is still involved in advancing the Internet’s development.  In 
December 2009 ARPA gave away a $40,000 prize as part of their Network Challenge, 
involving a nationwide hunt for large red balloons designed to study the effects of 
social networking and the Internet on “the timely communication, wide-area team-
building, and urgent mobilization required to solve broad-scope, time-critical prob-
lems.”  DARPA Network Challenge, DARPA, https://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/ 
Default.aspxhttps://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/Default.aspxhttps://network 
challenge.darpa.mil/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 193 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 194 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that 
a combined computer/telephone system constituted a facility and means of inter-
state commerce); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Trans-
mission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photo-
graphs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate 
commerce.”). 
 195 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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if the technology was available at the time to create a medium capa-
ble of facilitating that communication in a more efficient manner, 
the authors would have chosen that medium instead of the mail.  
Therefore, even if the DOD did not create ARPANET, Congress 
could have created the Internet under the grant of postal power in 
Article I, Section 8.  Likewise, if Congress can create post offices and 
post roads, then Congress impliedly can maintain those roads and of-
fices, regulate their operation, and police the use of the mail for the 
security of the system.
196
  Extrapolating to the modern form of com-
munication, Congress can regulate the Internet under the same grant 
of power. 
D. Adjusting § 1717 to Address Internet Speech 
Congress should implement a statutory approach to limiting In-
ternet dissemination of inciteful materials on the basis of § 1717.  
Like § 1717, the statute should prohibit the posting of materials ad-
vocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any 
law of the United States on the Internet.  Also like § 1717, this statute 
would be constitutional.  To avoid invoking Brandenburg’s imminency 
requirement, and in the interest of preserving the precious freedom 
of speech, the regulation should be narrowly tailored so as not to 
sweep too broadly, carefully drawing the distinction between advocat-
ing for the use of force or violence in the abstract, and speech in-
tended to incite an immediate use of force or violence. 
1. Proposed Statutory Language 
(a) It shall be unlawful to use the Internet to transmit material 
advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance 
to any law of the United States, where such material creates a sub-
stantial likelihood of an imminent threat of such actions upon 
viewing by the recipient of such material.  Such material shall not 
be hosted by any Internet Service Provider. 
(b) Whoever uses or attempts to use the Internet for the transmis-
sion of any matter declared by this section to be prohibited, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or 
both. 
 
 196 Cf. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 417 (U.S. 1819) (From the Constitutional 
grant of power in Art. 1, § 8, cl. 7 “to establish post offices and post roads” is inferred 
the power and duty to carry the mail and punish those who steal it.). 
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2. The Proposed Statute is Constitutional 
Masses sets up two threshold questions for applying the First 
Amendment in this type of situation.
197
  First, is the regulation a re-
straint prior to publication?  Second, is the regulation a post-
publication restraint that does not merely burden circulation, but 
eliminates it altogether?  This proposed statute satisfies both inqui-
ries.  For the same reasons that the nonmailability provision is not an 
unconstitutional burden on freedom of the press, the proposed regu-
lation of inciteful speech on the Internet is likewise not unconstitu-
tional. 
Further, under the reasoning of Rice, the imminence considera-
tion would apply only when inciteful speech is “mere advocacy” and 
not to the regulation of speech intended to provoke and aid in vio-
lent acts.  Thus, the proposed regulation would not invoke Branden-
burg, because it does not burden the freedom of speech.  If speech 
creates a substantial likelihood of an imminent threat, it cannot be 
viewed as “mere advocacy” or an abstract idea. 
Section 1717 is not a prior restraint on speech.  Individuals are 
free to print or publish any speech they choose, but if the material 
falls under the nonmailable provision, it simply cannot be trans-
ported through the mail.
198
  Likewise, a statute prohibiting insurrec-
tionist materials on the Internet would not be a prior restraint on 
speech.  It would merely prohibit the use of a particular medium of 
communication to disseminate materials advocating for insurrection 
or other illegal acts.  Just as § 1717 was merely an extension of the 
Comstock Act, this would, in essence, be an extension of § 1717 to 
cover a mode of communication not contemplated at the time of pas-
sage of the statute.  Courts, in applying the prohibition, would need 
to be careful so as to avoid applying the statute in an overly broad 
manner such that it would have a chilling effect on legitimate speech. 
In the proposed statutory language, imminence of the threat is 
not required.  This accounts for the lack of instantaneous communi-
cation in most Internet transactions.  The types of content that this 
language prohibits are very narrow, tracking the language in § 1717.  
Because the State has a strong interest in preventing the downfall of 
the nation, barring advocacy for treason, insurrection, and forcible 
resistance over the Internet should survive judicial scrutiny.  In these 
ways, this new statute should satisfy the First Amendment generally 
and Brandenburg in particular. 
 
 197 See supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra Part IV.A. 
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E. Arguments in Support of the New Statute 
1. Failure to Proscribe the Dissemination of 
Insurrectionist Materials on the Internet Would  
Defeat the Purpose of Section 1717 
Section 1717 is a valid restraint on the use of the postal service in 
furthering the compelling national interest in preserving the country 
and upholding the law.  To allow circumvention of this interest by al-
lowing the same materials banned from the mails to be disseminated 
on the Internet defeats the entire purpose of § 1717.  If a newsletter, 
for example, could be precluded from the mail based on inciteful or 
insurrectionist materials that are considered a danger to the public 
welfare, why allow the same material to be posted on the Internet?  
The Internet provides a far greater audience than direct mailing ever 
could and at a mere fraction of the cost.  The need for § 1717 has not 
diminished in the Internet age, but the reach of its protections is not 
great enough to fulfill its purpose. 
2 The New Statute Will Make Censorship Less Likely 
A statutory approach like this could also address the concerns of 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who have been pressured in recent 
years by the government to censor questionable material posted by 
their customers.
199
  Because the ISPs, as companies, do not fall under 
the same constitutional restraints as the government, when they re-
move content, no First Amendment right is infringed.
200
  The gov-
ernment has, according to some commentators, adopted the tactic of 
pressuring ISPs into a censorship by proxy role because officials do 
not have the direct authority to order the removal of content from 
the Internet.
201
  A statute such as the one proposed here would elimi-
nate this practice, which is looked upon by experts with “a jaundiced 
eye.”
202
 
3. Application to the Secession Case Study 
Governor Perry’s statements about the possibility of secession 
were vague and noncommittal.
203
  He seemed to indirectly address an 
abstract idea, which is exactly the kind of speech protected by Bran-
 
 199 See Montgomery, supra note 88, at 144. 
 200 See id. 
 201 See id. at 164–65. 
 202 Id. at 165. 
 203 See supra notes 20–36 and accompanying text. 
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denburg.  Were someone to post on the Internet what Governor Perry 
said in his Tea Party speeches, that content should be protected. 
Daniel Miller, the president of TNM, runs a website on which he 
expressly calls for Texas to secede from the Union.
204
  He organizes 
supporters, disseminates a petition, and posts blog entries in favor of 
Texas secession.  Miller’s suggestion that U.S. troops would fight 
against the U.S. in the event of a war of secession does not really rise 
to an effort to incite a violent response.  Miller ultimately advocates 
for state legislative action to hold a popular referendum on the ques-
tion of secession.  He argues that if the people approve a measure 
declaring independence, secession is legal.  These, again, are exam-
ples of advocacy for ideas, and are protected under Brandenburg.  
Even with a less stringent imminency component in the test, Miller’s 
message, while urging for a violation of U.S. law, does not call for vi-
olence, and is not likely to produce violence.  It may even be that Mil-
ler’s website is the modern example of Holmes’s “surreptitious pub-
lishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”
205
  Therefore, Miller’s 
speech should be protected by the First Amendment under an ex-
panded § 1717. 
Similarly, Debra Medina’s statements about a “bloody war” mere-
ly describe what she thinks might happen in her secessionist vision, 
and does not call for people to engage in violence or insurrection.
206
  
Her arguments regarding nullification are not a call for individuals to 
disobey federal law, but rather an expression of the idea that states 
have some kind of power under the Constitution to supersede federal 
law.  Medina’s speech would also be protected by the First Amend-
ment under an expanded § 1717. 
Larry Kilgore, by contrast, presents a close case.
207
  Kilgore open-
ly advocates for an immediate secession from the United States, and 
his speech in Austin might be considered by reasonable people to 
have been inciteful.  One specific posting by Kilgore to the Internet 
might fall under a new § 1717 for the Internet.  His Veteran’s Day 
message was a blatant call for support in a military coup.  This is an 
effort at direct incitement, and it is certainly an act of speech advocat-
ing for insurrection.  The likelihood of it being followed is debatable, 
but the gravity of the potential harm is immense.  With nearly a quar-
ter of a million people voting for Kilgore in a race for national office, 
 
 204 See supra Part II.A. 
 205 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 206 See supra Part II.B. 
 207 See supra Part II.C. 
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he can hardly be called “an unknown man.”
208
  It is no defense to say 
that secession itself is highly unlikely, because an armed attempt at 
secession by some disgruntled group or individual is far more likely 
than a successful attempt at secession.  This is speech that is not pro-
tected by Brandenburg, and would be prohibited from the Internet 
under the proposed statute. 
Finally, Clay Laird should not be permitted to post threats to the 
Internet.
209
  He advocates for violent secession, stating that he is will-
ing to die to achieve it and that those who oppose it will die as well.  
The self-titled “Certified Domestic Terrorist” warned Texas residents 
that if they did not like the political point of view he was espousing, 
they should leave or be driven out, and suggested his manner of 
doing so would involve weapons and ammunition.  He also stated that 
members of the military would assist in a war of secession upon re-
turn from deployment overseas.  Laird’s statements clearly do not 
constitute the advocacy of ideas in the abstract, especially in light of 
Laird’s in-person threats at the Capitol.  Posting such speech to the 
Internet should be restricted, and such speech is not protected under 
the First Amendment.  If Laird printed these postings out and mailed 
them, he would be in violation of § 1717 and subject to criminal pe-
nalty.  He should not be allowed to skirt the obvious intent of Con-
gress by instead posting them to the Internet, while at the same time 
reaching an even bigger potential audience. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Internet is a powerful medium of communication, and like 
many tools intended to build, it can also be wielded to destroy.  Web-
sites promoting violence, hate, insurrection, treason, and other 
crimes are freely published under current law.  This is a threat to 
both national security and personal safety.  Terrorists and criminals 
utilize this powerful tool to recruit followers and incite action.  The 
Internet was created by the U.S. government to improve national de-
fense, not to aid violent criminals.  A need for regulation of incen-
diary speech on the Internet exists, and § 1717 provides a constitu-
tional mode to achieve that regulation. 
Free speech over the Internet should be protected, but not all 
speech falls under the protection of the First Amendment.  The 
Brandenburg Doctrine is ill-suited to the context of Internet commu-
nications.  Under a modified version of § 1717, incendiary speech on 
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the Internet could be prohibited without doing damage to the liberty 
of the majority of Internet users, who do not advocate or recruit for 
violent resistance to U.S. law. 
The First Amendment guarantees the right to speak without 
prior restraint.  It does not exonerate the speaker from all responsi-
bility for the words he chooses.  It also does not guarantee equal 
access to all available media to spread that speech.  A State has a legi-
timate interest in preserving peace, upholding law, and protecting it-
self and its citizens from crime and violence.  If an act of speech con-
tributes to the likelihood of violence, indeed, when it is intended to 
do so, the State has the right to regulate that speech and if it is dan-
gerous enough, to prohibit it altogether.  This right of the State, 
however, must be exercised with the precision of a surgeon because it 
is, after all, an infringement on the absolute liberty of speech.  Just as 
a surgeon must delicately cut away a cancerous matter without da-
maging the far greater mass of healthy tissue, so too must a restraint 
on speech only dampen or silence the very dangerous, cancerous 
speech without harming the very liberty that protects all others.  But 
make no mistake: the cancer must be removed to preserve the entire 
body, or all will die together. 
 
